Article published by José Alberto León Alonso in El Día on 04/26/15.
Now that the local and regional elections are approaching, it seems like a good time to talk about the different existing electoral systems, given that ours seems very noticeable, generating problems of poor connection between the voter and the elected, as well as non-proportional results. One of the most interesting is the single transferable vote (STV). It is a voting system based on proportional representation and preferential voting. The voter nominally selects his candidates by ordering them numerically (\»1\», \»2\», \»3\»,...) according to his preferences, citing next to each candidate the position he should occupy. There are no party lists (neither closed nor open), but candidates from all parties are included on the same ballot, although next to the candidate's name the party to which he belongs or whether he is independent is usually identified. Nor are the names of those elected marked with an \"X\", nor is a single representative elected per constituency.
In an election through VUT, a candidate needs a minimum number of votes (the quota or threshold) to be elected, the lower the greater the number of representatives of the constituency. Under the VUT, a voter's vote is initially assigned to his or her favorite candidate, and if that candidate has already been elected or eliminated, the remaining votes are transferred to his or her second preference, and so on until his or her vote is assigned to one of his or her options. If the VUT were used in a district with only one candidate, it would still be a majority system, since the most preferred candidate would end up being elected, in a sort of automatic second round (or third, fourth, fifth, etc.). To consider it a proportional system, the VUT uses multi-member districts (with several seats or positions) that are applied in reduced constituencies (typically, 3 to 7 deputies or councilors).
As a mechanism for choosing representatives, the VUT is the most sophisticated of all electoral systems, since it allows choosing not only between parties, but also between candidates within the parties. The final results maintain a fair degree of proportionality and, since the multi-member districts are relatively small, an important geographical link between the voter and the representative is preserved. The VUT also offers better opportunities for the election of independent popular candidates than proportional representation by lists, because voters choose between candidates and not between parties. Political scientists have long recommended it as one of the most attractive electoral systems. However, its use has been limited to Ireland, Malta, Scotland, Australia and New Zealand. Because? Basically due to the slowness of the count, since normally each ballot must be recounted several times until all the positions to be elected are assigned. Until now, in small constituencies with few votes to recount, this procedure was acceptable, but in large electoral districts with hundreds of thousands of votes, it was extremely long (taking several days) and tedious. However, technological advances now make it possible to speed up the count so that in Scotland, which carries out the count using optical scanners, the results are known in less than a day.
If the main problem of our electoral system is that citizens do not feel well represented, the VUT is unanimously designated as the system that does it best, since it maintains the advantages of any proportional system in relation to votes, leaving minorities well represented, while recovering the possibility of electing people, individually, and carrying out personalized monitoring of their deputies, raising the quality of the legislators. As the vote is transferable, the vote that is lost disappears, and encourages the participation of independent candidates and the renewal of the political class. The most important thing is that it improves the relationship between the representative and his clients.
The VUT gives more power to voters than any other electoral system, taking that power away from political parties. It introduces powerful electoral incentives for parties to present powerful and balanced candidates to maximize the number of first preferences (those marked with No. 1), and allows voters to displace the candidates they dislike most from their own party, preventing them from being elected, since it is difficult for these candidates to obtain second, third or fourth preferences, which would prevent them from obtaining the election. This raises the possibility of voters punishing corrupt or fanatical candidates. It also favors candidates with a more transversal profile and capable of attracting voters from different parties, since second, third or fourth preferences are crucial when it comes to being elected. Likewise, the effectiveness of campaigns focused on highlighting the negative aspects of political rivals is very limited, or even counterproductive. Reduced because this negative campaign can take away votes from the rival, but it does not necessarily imply that the candidate who introduces this type of campaign wins. And counterproductive because distaste for this type of behavior can reduce the number of votes received in second, third or fourth preference for the candidate who uses it. Furthermore, it puts an end to the controversy of turncoats, given that voters select their representatives precisely for their opinions and personal characteristics, which implies that the vote is granted and “belongs” to the candidate and not to the party. Finally, avoid tactically wasting the vote on what we know as a “useful vote”, voting for the least bad of those eligible instead of the preferred candidate, since each voter can nominate their preferred candidate in first position without fearing that their vote will be wasted since, if their first option is not elected, their vote will be transferred to the second or subsequent options.
