Article published by José Alberto León Alonso in Diario de Avisos on 12/22/13.
I admit that I am fed up with the Catalan independence debate, but my annoyance is even greater when I read or hear obviously biased and false statements, especially with regard to the economic consequences of secession.
That's why I can't resist trying to put the dots over the i's in this matter. Let's go in parts. According to the secessionists:
1. Spain “steals” 16 billion euros annually from them, money that would allow them to freely finance their public services. For these calculations they use an unreasonable method, which imputes to Catalonia only the benefit of the services that are physically provided there, but excludes the services that the State institutions and infrastructure perform for its benefit from other places (foreign services, defense, etc.). No author outside of Catalonia admits this approach, but rather another in which the benefits are distributed among the regions depending on who benefits from them. According to this criterion, in 2010 Catalonia's fiscal deficit would amount to about 9,000 million euros, but today the deficit would be even smaller as Catalonia receives more unemployment and pension funds.
2. The regional financing system is discriminatory towards Catalonia. Our regional financing system is a real gibberish, nonsense without any meaning or meaning. Three communities have a negative balance compared to the rest of the country: Madrid, Catalonia and the Balearic Islands. But this is due to its higher income, since Catalonia does not receive worse treatment (discrimination) than the other rich communities. In fact, the citizens of Madrid lose, after the redistributive action, 8% of their income, while the citizens of Catalonia lose around 2%. What does not make sense is that after the redistribution of income between the rich and poor regions, some of the poor regions (Extremadura and Asturias) end up receiving more funds per inhabitant than the rich ones. Nor do some of the rich ones (Basque Country and Navarra) earn even more. So, it is a stupid, non-discriminatory system.
3. Pensions would rise in an independent Catalonia. A great falsehood. According to Social Security data, until October 2013 Catalonia accumulated a pension deficit of 4,331 million euros, as its population is one of the oldest in Spain and the average pension received by its pensioners is one of the largest in the country. Therefore, this deficit should be covered by the new State or pensions should be reduced on average by about 3,200 euros per year.
4. Spain has more to lose than Catalonia if it becomes independent. Fake. Size matters, and the Catalan market is less important for Spain than the rest of Spain's market is for Catalonia. Even after the “velvet” separation between Czechia and Slovakia, mutual trade was reduced by more than 50%, so in our case it would be worse. The probable mutual boycotts would affect Catalan companies (which sell almost 50,000 million euros, 25% of their total production, to the rest of Spain) proportionally more than Spanish companies (which sell only 2.5% of what they produce in Catalonia). For Spain, the Catalan market has a similar importance to the German one, but for Catalonia the market in the rest of Spain has a similar size to the European one. Additionally, the thousands of Catalan companies with a national projection pay taxes there for the profits they obtain from their sales in the rest of Spain, and after the secession they would pay them in Spain, so the public income of an independent Catalonia would be even lower. We would all lose, but there is no color.
5. Even if Catalonia left the EU, it could continue to maintain the euro as its currency. True, although it is not an option without problems. The new state would have to borrow euros or put restrictions on imports to balance the current deficit trade balance, with the consequent rise in the cost of life. It would not participate in the European financial institutions and therefore would not have any decision-making power. It would lack direct access to the liquidity of the Eurosystem and its financing conditions, and without this liquidity the only two Catalan banks (Sabadell and Caixa) would go bankrupt or be forced to move their headquarters outside the new state (along with the taxes they pay).
6. Financing through the markets would improve in an independent Catalonia. After the separation, Catalonia would find itself facing a tough decision: adopt the Euro or create its own currency. Regarding the first option we have already seen that there is strong uncertainty. If it issued its own currency it would depreciate at least 20% against the euro, which would make its imports more expensive. Given that imports account for 45% of Catalonia's GDP, the standard of living of Catalans would be reduced by 9% and, even worse, the debts of companies and citizens with banks would continue to be denominated in euros, so that they would increase by 20% or more in the new currency. Additionally, many of the thousands of foreign companies in Catalonia would leave their territory to settle elsewhere within the EU umbrella, and not face customs, borders and obstacles to trade, nor the exchange risk of the new currency. For a time (between 1.5 and 3 years) Catalonia would lose access to financial markets, and would live on the verge of default due to its deficit and inevitable need for financing, putting the payment of public payrolls, pensions and public services at risk. To avoid default, it would have to make a brutal spending cut, adjusting to zero deficit in a single day. All of this would cause them to experience an additional contraction of GDP close to 7 points, which would in turn generate lower revenue and the need for new adjustments. In conclusion: in the short term, Catalonia could hardly meet its financial needs.
As you can see, the post-secession reality is very far from that happy Arcadia that some want to paint. I think the Catalans are being deceived by their politicians. And although, immersed in fatigue, the independence of Catalonia seems to me to be the liberation of a heavy burden, the departure of some Protestant neighbors, I greatly fear that the breakup would not constitute the end of the problems but rather the beginning of new, even more serious ones. Not only would the distribution of the common debt be complicated and prone to new reproaches and complaints, but it is likely that independent Catalonia would maintain territorial claims over the Catalan-speaking regions that remained in Spain. The evil Spanish enemy would continue to infiltrate and lurk behind the border, so there would be no rest in the face of so much confrontation.
Is there any basis for the Catalan complaint? Just one. Criticism of our regional financing system. It makes no sense that after the redistribution of income between rich and poor regions, the poor end up receiving more funds per inhabitant than the rich. That's nonsense. In 2014, it is planned to modify this system and the new one should guarantee essential services in all the Autonomous Communities, but limit solidarity by introducing ordinality, according to which the regions maintain the same position in the classification of per capita wealth before and after the distribution. The communities would receive the necessary financing to finance fundamental public services (health, education and social services), which represent about 75% of spending, but not for other non-essential expenses such as regional television, embassies or a ruinous business public sector. They should finance that 25% of discretionary spending with their own income, if they have any left over for it. But to modify the regional financing system it was not necessary to create this mess, nor deceive its citizens with chimericals.



