Article published by José Alberto León Alonso in the August 2018 issue of La Gaveta Económica.
"More money has been lost because of four words than because of a drawn gun. Those words are: this time it's different," say Rogoff and Reinhart in their book This time it's different, eight centuries of financial foolishness. Economists tend to smile wryly when, in moments of market euphoria, we hear fillers like “the paradigms of the past have stopped working,” “the technological revolution has put an end to economic cycles,” or that something “will never go down in price.” It already happened before the burst of the.com bubble at the beginning of this century, with housing in the first decade of the 21st century, or it is happening now with cryptocurrencies. The reality is that financial crises are inherent to the system itself and have occurred recurrently for centuries, and that we better study economic history to learn from past mistakes.
However, and without serving as a precedent, I do believe that today we are in a position to affirm that “this time it will be different.” It is not that we are going to end economic cycles or crises, but simply that there are no historical precedents for our current situation and we have no idea how the current cycle of economic boom is going to end.
This will affect savers, for whom the 60/40 long-term savings portfolio model is well known. Thinking about retirement, it basically consists of allocating 60% of savings to variable income (stocks) and 40% to fixed income (bonds). This basic formula, which is usually modified depending on the age of the saver, has worked reasonably well in the past, guaranteeing a non-negligible return, while reducing the impact of large falls in the stock markets. But if it has worked well, why “this time is different”? The fundamental difference compared to other historical moments is in the role of bonds. Bonds play three fundamental functions in this type of portfolios. They generate: 1) income for the saver in the form of interest, 2) stability with respect to the enormous volatility of the stock market, and 3) diversification in the portfolio since they tend to perform very well precisely when the stock market does very poorly. Well, all of these functions are in question at this precise historical moment when they have never been before. The lowering of interest rates and the purchase of debt by central banks has caused: 1) that interest rates are today the lowest since historical records exist; 2) that the sensitivity of medium and long-term bonds to the slightest alteration in interest rates is also the greatest in history; and 3) that it is likely that if the stock market falls, the fixed income market will also fall.
The purchase of trillions of euros in bonds by central banks has increased their price and reduced their profitability. Never before have central banks bought such an amount of debt, hence there is no precedent for what will happen when they stop doing so (or continue to do so). This low yield on bonds has caused investors and savers to have sought that income elsewhere, in bonds with a longer term, in stocks with generous dividends or in real estate investments, which has pushed up their prices and made them expensive and, therefore, less profitable.
Investors today are worried (and with good reason) that the economy will slow down or, worse yet, enter a recession. But they think that, in case of difficulties, bonds are the place to take refuge. Thus, in recent months there has been a continuous transfer from variable income funds to fixed income funds. Now, it is true that normally stocks and bonds do not usually move in the same direction, which in jargon is called “they are not correlated”, but this has not always been the case. Stocks and bonds tend to follow the same path (to correlate) when monetary policy tightens. In our case, when interest rates rise and/or central banks stop buying bonds in the market. This tightening of monetary policy has already been gradually occurring in the United States, but it has not even begun to do so in Europe, Japan or the United Kingdom. Bond volatility increases abruptly when the expectation of a rise in interest rates grows unexpectedly, the trigger for which could be a sudden rise in inflation. Inflation is growing and the herd of wildebeest investors is restless, so the stampede can be unleashed by any small incident, especially with an arsonist as a tenant of the White House. Two small scares in this regard occurred at the beginning of 2013 and at the end of 2016, when investors thought that the US Federal Reserve was going to quickly tighten its monetary policy. Those scares ended up coming to nothing, but for a few months the returns on stocks and bonds fell in unison.
Savers allocate a good part of their money to fixed-income investment funds, trusting that they will be safe in the event of a fall in the stock markets, but they usually do not know what their savings are invested in these funds. The reality is that 75% of fixed income funds are invested in fixed income of various risks, but not in the safest assets (sovereign debt of countries “that cannot go bankrupt” such as the United States, Switzerland or Germany). And even 90% of that 25% of funds invested in fixed income from countries with the highest quality are concentrated in long or medium duration bonds, in an attempt to obtain a minimum return on the invested funds. As a result, only 2% of savings allocated to fixed income are concentrated in short-term bills from countries with the safest sovereign debt, the least susceptible to a rise in interest rates. In this way, the mere expectation of an unexpected increase in interest rates would lead, not only to a fall in the stock markets, but also in 98% of fixed income assets. I remember how at the beginning of the Great Recession of 2008, savers were surprised that their monetary or fixed income funds were losing value. Who is going to want 10-year bonds from Spain at 1.3% or from Germany at 0.3% when new bond issues occur at rates two or three (or more) percentage points higher? Their value will fall forcibly, and the funds that own them, too.
Where the wildebeest will head when they stampede is anyone's guess, but it is certain that the medium and long-term bonds of any country will lose value, especially those of less safe countries. Savers would do well, at least, to move their money to funds that invest in sovereign debt of the best quality and shorter duration or to safe haven assets in the event of a stampede. What safe haven assets? I have my own theory, but it is nothing more than that, a theory, since there is no precedent for a situation similar to the current one to confirm it. So I keep it to myself. Not in vain, this time it is different.



